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Abstract 
To thwart the virtual machines from being a victim of XSS attacks on the cloud computing environment, this paper presents an 
enhanced XSS defensive methodology for the cloud platforms. This framework initially scans the HTTP requests for the 
embedded URI links that points towards the links of external JS files and which may contain malicious XSS payload. Our design 
also explores the HTTP response for extracting the script content and compares this content with the script content retrieved from 
the URI links. Any resemblance observed in both these extracted set of scripts would be considered as malicious XSS worm. The 
testing and evaluation of our framework was done on tested bed of real world web applications by injecting the XSS attack 
payloads on their vulnerable injection points. Evaluation results revealed that our framework detects the XSS attack vectors with 
fewer rates of false negatives and false positives.  
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1. Introduction 
In the modern era of World Wide Web (WWW), there are many web application vulnerabilities (e.g., XSS attacks 
[2] etc.) that need to be addressed; cloud service providers must deploy secure transmission technologies. Keeping in 
view several security issues, numerous organizations avoid the migration to cloud platforms [22]. Threats related to 
cloud computing environment include compliance risk, transportability concerns, virtualization vulnerabilities, 
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DDoS attacks, web application security issues, etc. In this paper, we have focused on developing a robust XSS 
defensive solution that detects the transmission of XSS worms on the cloud platforms. Although, researchers have  
proposed several defensive solutions related to XSS worms. However, there is no robust solution developed till now 
for the detection of XSS worms on the cloud environment. 
 
Fig. 1. Exploitation of XSS attack on Vulnerable Web Application (VWA) of Cloud Platform. 
 
XSS attack [3, 23] is the utmost harmful and widespread security issue affecting web applications in the cloud 
platforms. A successful cross site scripting attack can result in stern security violations for not only the user but also 
for the web site deployed in the cloud computing environment [10-13]. If an application doesn’t validate its  input, a 
hacker can insert a malicious script and steal cookies, hijack a user’s account,  transfer private information, cause 
denial of service attack, manipulate the web content, and many more malicious activities. XSS has appeared as one 
of the utmost severe dangers on the WWW. Fig. 1 illustrates the abstract view of exploitation of XSS attack on a 
vulnerable web application server deployed in the cloud platform. 
Table 1. Flavors of XSS Attacks and its Description 
S. No. Class of XSS Attacks Description Exploitation Location  Level of Social 
Engineering to 
Exploit 
1 Stored XSS Attack (or 
Persistent XSS Attack) 
Malicious script transmitted simply once and is 
executed on consequent visits in the web page. 
Server-Side Script Low 
2 Reflected XSS Attack (or 
Non-Persistent Attack) 
Malicious script transmitted by the client’s web 
browser and is straightly reflected back. 
Server-Side Script High 
3 DOM-Based XSS Attacks Malicious script activated via unsafe client-side 
source code. 
Client-Side Script High 
4 Mutation-Based XSS 
Attacks 
Malicious script activated by altering the DOM 
sinks.  
Client-Side Script High 
 
Although XSS attack comes in four different flavors: Reflected, Stored, DOM-Injection Based and Mutation-Based 
XSS attacks. Table 1 highlights the brief description of these four different categories of attacks. However, most of 
the exploitation of vulnerabilities of XSS attacks are performed by second category of XSS attack (i.e. reflected 
XSS attacks) on the cloud platforms as well as on the real world Online social networking (OSN) websites (like 
Facebook, Twitter, Linkedin, etc.). In reflected XSS attack, the malicious attack payload is “reflected” through a 
server [21]. The malicious attacker injects malicious script into specific web form, which usually returns the 
malicious string back to the victim’s web site, utilizing the data injected to produce a HTTP response on the fly. The 
malicious attack payload that is perceived as belonging to the similar domain as the rest of the website is then 
executed. This attack is the utmost shared category of attack. Fig. 2 explains the pattern example of this class of 
attack. 
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Fig. 2. Abstract View of Exploitation of Reflected XSS Attack  
 
Numerous defensive solutions for XSS attacks have been proposed by researchers. Generally, two categories of 
defensive solutions are developed: client-side and server-side XSS defensive solutions. Noncespaces [5] is an end-
to-end mechanism that facilitates web browsers to differentiate between benign and malicious content to apply the 
techniques from Instruction Set Randomization (ISR) for thwarting the exploitation of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) 
vulnerabilities. Louw et al. [7] proposed a server-side solution BLUEPRINT to thwart Cross Site Scripting attacks 
where the web application transfers two replicas of output HTML document to a web browser for detecting any 
deviation, one with user inputs and other with legitimate values. This approach reduces the dependency on web 
browsers in recognizing unsafe content over the network. ScriptGard [6] is a complementary technique that 
presumes the collection of accurate sanitizers and injects them to match the parsing context of web browser. 
Scriptgard can automatically discover and correct mismatches between sanitization routines and the context. SWAP 
[8] is generally operated based on the notion of discovering all static script calls in the web application and encoded 
them into syntactically invalid identifiers (script IDs) and therefore unknown to the java script detection component. 
Pelizzi et al. [4] proposed an XSS filter, XSSFilt, which could discover non-persistent XSS vulnerabilities. This 
filter identifies and thwarts portions of address URL from giving an appearance in web page. This filter could also 
discover partial script insertions. The weakness that XSSFilt possess is that it operates considerably slower. XSS 
Auditor [9] is a filter that realizes equally extraordinary performance as well as high accuracy via jamming scripts 
following the HTML parsing and prior to execution. It also scans the DOM tree generated by the HTML parser for 
the clear interpretation of the semantics of the bytes. The main issue with XSS Auditor is that it cannot solve the 
problem of isolating untrusted data from trusted data. 
 
The above state-of-art techniques on XSS defensive techniques protect the real world web applications from the 
vulnerabilities of XSS attacks. However, these existing techniques cannot be easily integrated in cloud virtual 
machines/servers. Since these techniques requires numerous modifications in the source code of the web browser as 
well as web applications. Hence, it becomes a bottleneck for the developers of web applications to incorporate such 
modifications in the existing platforms of web applications and web browsers. In addition to this, the existing 
defensive techniques suffer from high rate of false negatives and false positives and incur high dynamic runtime 
overhead. To address these issues, this paper presents a robust cloud-based XSS defensive model that scans for the 
propagation of XSS worms in the web applications deployed in the cloud platforms. The proposed model is 
deployed in the Virtual Cloud Server (VCS) and compares the two sets of extracted scripts with each other 
embedded in the HTTP request (HREQ) and HTTP response (HRES) pairs. Any resemblance found in these two sets of 
scripts will be declared as a potential XSS worm. 
 
2. Proposed Framework 
 
This paper presents a robust XSS defensive framework for the cloud platforms which detects the transmission of 
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reflected XSS worms in the web applications deployed in the virtual machines of cloud environment. The proposed 
technique is dual-based: Firstly, it detects the URI links embedded in the HTTP request. The existence of URI links 
point towards the external JavaScript (JS) files located in the remote servers of cloud platforms. Hence, the key goal 
of the first phase is to extract the set of external JS files by referring their URI links. The second phase extracts the 
set of scripts embedded in the generated document of HTTP response. Such scripts generally arise due to the 
submission of GET/POST method in the HTTP request. Both these extracted set of scripts in these two phases will 
be decoded in a recursive manner until all the JS characters of both these sets will gets transformed in readable form. 
Now, both these decoded set of scripts will be explored for any similarity between their characters. If any 
resemblance is observed in these two sets of scripts that will simple declared as the presence of reflected XSS worm. 
The overall design of proposed XSS defensive framework for the cloud platforms is depicted in the Fig. 3. 
 
Fig. 3. Proposed Design of XSS Defensive Framework in Cloud Platforms 
The main modules of proposed cloud-based XSS defensive framework are deployed on the Virtual Cloud Server 
(VCS). It has six main modules: External JavaScript (JS) Link Extractor, Document Generator, Script Extractor, 
Virtual Decoder, Resemblance Detector and Virtual XSS Sanitizer. 
Fig. 4. Algorithm for Extracting External JavaScript (JS) Files 
Algorithm: JavaScript (JS) Link Extractor 
Input: Set of extracted HTTP requests (HREQ1, HREQ2, HREQ3,-----------HREQN) 
Output: Set of retrieved JavaScript Links (JSL1, JSL2, JSL3,-----------JSLN) 
START 
Extract all possible (HREQ1, HREQ2, HREQ3, -----------HREQN) from the cloud user. 
Retrieve all the set of parameter values (P1, P2, P3, P4, -------- PN) embedded in the set of extracted (HREQ1, HREQ2, HREQ3, -----------HREQN). 
FOR EACH extracted parameter value as Param 
                     Check the existence of URI links in the set of extracted parameter values. 
                     IF URI link exists{ 
                     Retrieve it and transmit the AJAX Request (AJAXREQ) to the external web server for retrieving the 
                     set of external JavaScript Links (JSL1, JSL2, JSL3, ----------- JSLN). 
                     Transmit these extracted links to the Virtual decoder.} 
                     ELSE{ 
                     Transmit the set of Parameter values to the virtual XSS sanitizer.} 
END 
 
1) External JavaScript (JS) Link Extractor: This module is responsible for retrieving the external JS files located 
in the remote servers of cloud platforms. This is generally done by referring the URI links embedded in the 
HTTP request. The following algorithm shown in the Fig. 4 illustrates the process of retrieving the external JS 
files located in remote servers of cloud computing environments.  
2) Document Generator: This module is responsible for generating the HTML document or web page 
corresponding to the extracted HTTP response message. The HTML document is generally produced by 
referring the GET/POST method of submission of HTTP request.  
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3) Script Extractor: This component extracts the injected scripts embedded in the HTTP response message. The 
script extracted can be either through GET method or POST method. This component also extracts the list of 
probable malicious functions that can be utilized for executing the malicious operations. Table 2 highlights the 
list of such malicious functions that can be used for invoking JS content. 
4) Virtual Decoder: This segment is responsible for executing recursive decoding procedure on both these 
extracted set of scripts obtained in the external JS link extractor module and script extractor module. The 
detailed algorithm of script extraction and recursive virtual decoding method is explained in the Fig. 5. 
5) Resemblance Detector: The key goal of this unit is to detect the similar set of JS characters in both these 
decoded set of scripts. Any sort of resemblance observed in both these sets will be declared as a possible XSS 
worm. 
Table 2. List of Malicious JavaScript Functions 
Function Call Pattern Intension 
SetCookie() Set cookie to mark 
GetCookie() Check Cookie 
createXMLHTTPRequest() Download exploit file to Local System 
unescape() Obfuscation to evade checking 
document.write() Generate dynamic document content 
element.appendChild() append new element to current one 
dateObject.toGMTString() generate time String used in cookie 
newActiveXObject create new Active Object 
document.createElement() create new document 
Once the deciphered code is obtained by virtual decoder, a resemblance detection method is executed for the 
detection of an expected XSS attack vectors. A string comparison recognition procedure founded on the concept of 
trigrams [18] for handling JavaScript complication methods like code nesting. Trigrams represent generally three 
character substrings of particular series of strings, utilized for identifying the similarity between the two set of 
strings. Following are the two descriptions of the algorithm of trigram: 
 
Description 1:  TRG represents the category of trigrams of string s. 
Description 2: Sim a, b represents the resemblance between two strings a and b, where a A, b   B, and both A and 
B are defined categories of strings. 
The resemblance between the two strings a and b can be well-defined as follows: 









                                                                                 
(1) 
In our present situation, A is defined as the category of scripts retrieved from the external remote servers, and set B 
represents the category of scripts retrieved from the HTTP response. The generalized value of Sim a, b varies in 
between 0 and 1 inclusive. 
Algorithm: Script Extractor and Virtual Decoding Process 
Input: Set of retrieved HTTP responses (HRES1, HRES2, HRES3, ----------- HRESN) from the WAS. 
Output: Collection of extracted scripts from the set of retrieved HTTP responses. 
START 
Refer the GET and POST method for identifying the technique of submission of HTTP request messages.  
Generate the document on the VCS corresponding to each retrieved HTTP response message from the WAS. 
Parse the generated document for the creation of text and script vertices. 
Identify the script content in each set of script vertices (SV1, SV2, SV3, -------- SVN) 
Perform the decoding on the extracted set of scripts corresponding to JavaScript Links (JSL1, JSL2, JSL3, -----------JSLN) and script content 
corresponding to extracted script vertices (SV1, SV2, SV3, -------- SVN). 
Transmit both these set of scripts to the virtual decoder for performing the decoding operations on both these sets in a repetitive manner. 
The detection of similar code will indicate the presence of XSS worms in the extracted JS code and an alert will be transmitted to the cloud user. 
END 
Fig. 5. Algorithm for Script Extraction and Virtual Decoding Process 
1600   Shashank Gupta and B.B. Gupta /  Procedia Technology  24 ( 2016 )  1595 – 1602 
6) Virtual XSS Sanitizer: Lastly, this module is responsible for performing context-sensitive sanitization on the 
decoded set of scripts for its safe interpretation on the web browser of cloud user. Table 3 illustrates the list of 
encoded variants of ‘<’. The context-sensitive sanitization will be performed only if no similar set of JS code is 
detected between the two extracted set of scripts in the VCS. 
Table 3. List of Encoded Variants of ‘<’ 
 
                
3. Experimental Evaluation 
 
The experiment background is simulated with the help of a normal desktop system, comprising 1.6 GHz Intel Dual 
Core processor, 2 GB DDR2 RAM and Windows 7 operating system. We have also utilized the VMware 
Workstation 7 for modifying two virtual desktop systems to act as a Virtual Cloud Server (VCS) and including one 
desktop system to be act as Web Application Server (WAS). In addition to this, we have also utilized a tested suite 
of two real time web applications vulnerable to XSS attacks and installed their settings on the cloud platform. 
OsCommerce [19] is a freely available e-commerce and online store-management web application. It could be 
utilized on numerous web servers like MYSQL, WAMP etc. PhpBB v2 [20] is a web-based forum software. This 
web application permits the listed users to execute numerous activities like production of new threads, comments, 
transmit the message to other online users. This version is infamous regarding the quantity of vulnerabilities it 
encompasses, and therefore, we involved such web application for this motivation. 
 
    
Fig. 6. (a) Observed Results of OsCommerce; (b) Observed Results of PhpBB v2;  
We have also used the malicious XSS attack vectors from the XSS cheat sheet [14] and tested on the extracted 
injection points of these web applications. We have injected the five different categories of XSS attack vectors (i.e. 
event handlers, character encoding tags, URL obfuscation, HTML entity elements and embedded character tags). 
Fig. 6(a) and Fig. 6(b) highlight the detailed statistics of observed results on all the two platforms of web 
applications deployed on our cloud platform. It is clearly reflected from these statistics that the proposed design is 
capable of detecting and mitigating the effect of XSS vulnerabilities with low rate of false positives as well as false 
negatives. The evaluation results reveal that the VCS deployed on the cloud platform precisely detects the 
propagation of reflected category of XSS worms by successfully comparing the two extracted script sets embedded 
in the HTTP request and HTTP response messages.  
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3.1 Strengths of our Approach 
The proposed cloud-based XSS defensive framework detects the transmission of reflected XSS worms with less rate 
of false negatives as well as false positives and incur acceptable runtime overhead. Following are some of the 
observed strengths of our approach: 
1) High Precision Rate: The proposed cloud-based XSS defensive mechanism detects the transmission of XSS 
worms with less number of false positives and false negatives. 
2) High Transparency: Our framework deployed in the VCS has lowest perceptibility from attacker’s perception, 
cloud service provider and service users. 
3) High Efficiency:  The proposed system is efficient enough to detect the propagation of XSS worms in deployed 
virtual machines of cloud platforms. 
4) High Dynamic Reaction: The proposed model is quite impressive enough to circumvent the propagation of XSS 
worms with negligible effect on usual functionalities of cloud computing environment. 
5) High Level of Deploy ability: Our proposed design can be easily deployed in other platforms of cloud 
computing environment. 
3.2 Comparison 
Table 5 illustrates the comparison of existing XSS defensive solutions developed on non-cloud platforms with our 
cloud-based XSS defensive work. We have utilized four different metrics i.e. methodology utilized, Required Web 
Browser Modifications (RWBM), Required Browsing Source Code of Web applications (RBSCW) and Required 
Modification in Source Code of Web Applications (RMSCW). Techniques like Noncespces [5] and SWAP [8] are 
all dependent on these three metrics (i.e. RWBM, RBSCW and RMSCW). It is clearly reflected from the Table 4 
that none of the existing XSS defensive methodology implemented on non-cloud platforms is independent from the 
burden of these three essential metrics. However, our cloud-based XSS defensive solution is entirely based on the 
comparison of HTTP request and generated HTTP response messages. Therefore, our technique does not require 
these operations. Hence, this adequately validates the effectiveness of our XSS defensive technique deployed on the 
platforms of cloud.  
Table 4. Comparison of Existing XSS Defensive Solutions 


































RWBM 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 
RBSCW 5 5 5 4 4 5 4 
RMSCW 5 4 5 5 4 5 4 
 
4. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
This paper presents a novel cloud-based XSS defensive framework for the virtual machines of cloud computing 
environment. To the best of our knowledge, our framework is the first robust design which detects the propagation 
of reflected XSS worms in cloud platforms. It explores the vulnerable HTTP requests for the detection of embedded 
URL links, which points towards the external JavaScript files located in the remote servers. These files may contain 
XSS worm payloads. It also scans the HTTP response generated at the web application server for the injected 
JavaScript code. Now, both these extracted set of JavaScript files will be explored for the similar code and if found 
will be declared as a potential XSS worm.  
The testing and evaluation of proposed design has been done on the test bed of real world web applications deployed 
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in the cloud platforms. The experimental results reveal that our framework detects the XSS worms with low rate of 
false positives and false negatives. The novelty of our design lies in the fact that the developers of web application 
need not to modify the source code of web applications deployed in the cloud platforms as well as web browsers. In 
addition to this, we will evaluate our proposed framework on some more real world web applications as well as 
OSN-based web applications as a part of our further work. We will also try to integrate the capabilities of our 
proposed framework on other platforms of cloud computing. 
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